

# Leadership Effects: School Principals and Student Outcomes\*

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## Abstract

We identify the effect of individual high school principals on graduation rates and English exam scores using an administrative data set of grade 12 students in BC Canada. Many principals were rotated across schools by districts, permitting isolation of the effect of principals from the effect of schools. We estimate the variance of the idiosyncratic effect of principals on student outcomes using a semi-parametric technique assuming the effect is time invariant. We also allow for the possibility that principals take time to realize their full effect at a school.

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# 1 Introduction

Years after the Coleman Report (1966) on schooling in the United States, there remains considerable debate on whether schools can actually improve student outcomes.<sup>1</sup> The Report's authors claimed that measurable school inputs, such as spending per student, pupil-teacher ratios, and the education and experience of teachers, had no significant effect on student outcomes, once student family background and peer effects were controlled for. However, more recent research focusing on unobservable teacher "quality" (or, teacher "fixed effects") finds that teachers matter,<sup>2</sup> supporting claims in parts of the education literature. In this paper, we employ the techniques from the teacher fixed effect literature to examine a less studied part of the schooling production function: principals.

School principals may affect student outcomes through a variety of paths. As school leaders, they have considerable influence on aspects of the school such as teacher supervision and retention, introducing new curricula (in some cases) and teaching techniques, student discipline, and student allocation to teachers and classes. Education scholars have grouped these pathways into: (1) purposes and goals, (2) structure and social networks, (3) people, and (4) organizational culture (Hallinger and Heck(1998)). Research in that literature has examined the impact of principals within a wider agenda of attempting to identify the attributes of high achieving or effective schools and has found mixed results concerning principal effects (Hallinger and Heck(1998)). However, most of the education literature research is based on surveys of teacher perceptions about leadership and school conditions, raising concerns about endogeneity and mis-measurement.<sup>3</sup> As we will discuss momentarily, there is now a small but growing economics

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<sup>1</sup>The exchange between Krueger (2003) and Hanushek (2003) highlights the extent of this debate.

<sup>2</sup>This research includes, among others, Goldhaber and Brewer (1997), Park and Hannum (2002), Rowan et al (2002), Uribe et al (2003), Rockoff (2004), Nye et al (2004), Rivkin et al (2005), Kane et al (2008), Aaronson et al (2007), Konstantanopoulos (2007), Leigh (2007) and Koedel (2008). Older teacher fixed effect studies include Hanushek (1971), Armor et al (1976) and Murnane and Phillips (1981).

<sup>3</sup>For example, in the survey used in Leithwood and Jantzi (1999) teachers are asked to rate how strongly they agree with the statement, "Our school administrators have a strong presence in the school."

literature on principal effects. We add to that literature by providing estimates employing data variation from principal changes where a significant portion of those changes are due to school district principal rotation practices. We also explicitly introduce the possibility of quite flexible principal tenure effects into the measurement of principal impacts. We allow for tenure effects to be different in both size and sign across principals and schools, rather than imposing the standard technique of only allowing the same tenure profile for all principals. This is particularly important in the leadership setting, as principals new to a school could be of higher or lower quality than the principals that preceded them.

We estimate the effect of individual school principals on student high school graduation probabilities and grade 12 provincial final exam scores employing a unique administrative dataset from the Canadian province of British Columbia. School districts in British Columbia rotate high school principals across schools, with this being a stated policy in some districts and a reflection of ongoing principal turnover in others. Taking advantage of this, we employ turnover of principals within schools over time to identify their effects on student outcomes purged of any fixed school, neighborhood or stable peer group effects. We use administrative information on all students entering grade 12 in British Columbia (BC) over the 1995 to 2004 period. Unlike in many U.S. jurisdictions that have received attention in recent years (see e.g., Jacob and Levitt (2003), Figlio (2006), McNeil et al. (2008)), there are no direct incentives for principals to meet specific graduation rate or exam score targets for their schools. School funding is based on a fixed formula that is mainly a function of the number of students and neither it nor principal compensation is based on student outcomes. This is important because, as the U.S. literature highlights, in situations with clear funding and pay incentives based on student outcomes, there is an incentive for principals to “game” outcomes so that a person who appears to be an effective principal may just be one who is a good strategic player. We don’t claim that cheating is entirely absent among this set of principals, since they are at least being implicitly evaluated on the

outcomes in their schools, but the lack of clear incentives suggests this may not be a primary issue in our data.

Our empirical strategy has two main components. First, we adapt the technique used by Rivkin et al (2005) in their study of teacher effects to identify a lower bound estimate of the variance in the quality of individual school principals. We refer to “quality” as the impact a principal has on student outcomes. In essence, the idea behind the estimator is that if principals have individual effects on school outcomes, then the variance of those outcomes should be greater in schools which have more principals over a given time period. Unlike Rivkin et al (2005), we do not follow students longitudinally and so cannot control for individual student fixed effects. Thus, our identification requires that principals were not rotated across schools in response to changes in the quality of students, and that students do not sort themselves across schools in response to principal changes. Importantly, our estimation technique does allow for principal allocation based on long-run average student quality in the school; just not on changes in student quality over time. This technique assumes that individual principals have an immediate and constant effect on the schools that they lead. The main benefit of this strategy is that it provides a direct statistical test of whether there are observable differences in student outcomes across principals, that is, a test of whether there is positive variance in the quality of school principals. The approach, in fact, yields a lower bound estimate of the variance of principal effects under the assumptions just mentioned: no sorting of students in response to principal assignments; linearly additive school and principal fixed effects; and no changes in principal effects with tenure at the school.

In the second component of our empirical strategy, we estimate a simple dynamic model of the effect of school principals on student outcomes. This strategy allows for a potentially cumulative effect of school principals on schools over time. A glance at the routes through which principals are hypothesized to influence outcomes suggests that it may take a number of

years for them to have a measurable influence on student outcomes. If we do not take this into account then an approach like our first, semi-parametric technique may under-estimate the true full impact a principal could have on a school (given enough time). In particular, in a school in which the principal turned over every year, no principal may be able to put his or her “mark” on the school. The result would be a lower variance in outcomes over time within the school than one would witness if each principal’s full effect were realized. We interpret the second approach as relaxing the assumption of immediately-evident, time-invariant principal effects in the first approach. This advantage comes at the cost of assuming a parametric form for the principal tenure profile. As before, it requires assumptions of no experience effects and no student sorting. In both the time invariant effect and dynamic estimation strategies, we estimate the effect of individual school principals on student outcomes after first controlling for aggregate time effects and a number of individual student and neighborhood characteristics.

Our analysis adds to a small but growing number of economic analyses of school principals. Gates et al (2006) found principals were more likely to leave schools with higher proportions of minority students. Cullen and Mazzeo (2007) find evidence that higher school performance is followed by higher pay for the principal in Texas schools. This does not appear to be feasible in the BC system, where principal incomes are often determined on a pre-set grid.<sup>4</sup> Branch et al (2008) find small tenure and experience effects on student performance for principals in Texas schools. They also find large variation in principal fixed effects, using switching principals only in identification. Lavy (2008) investigates the effect of raising school principal pay on high school student outcomes in Israel, and finds sizable effects on high school graduation and matriculation exam scores. Clark et al (2009), using school data for students in grades 3 through 8, find significant principal experience effects, but no education effect and mixed training effects in New York City schools. Miller (2009) finds that a downturn in student performance precedes

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<sup>4</sup>We discuss principal compensation in BC in the next section of the paper.

a principal departure, and that principal transition lowers teacher retention in North Carolina schools. Cullen and Mazzeo (2007), Branch et al (2008), Clark et al (2009) and Miller (2009) all found higher principal turnover occurred in low performing schools, and that switching principals are more likely to go to higher achieving schools.<sup>5</sup>

We add to this growing literature in a number of ways. To begin, our data contains a particularly large number of principal switches, which is the basis for our identification strategy. Second, we use that variation to provide a semi-parametric estimate of the variance of principal effects, after controlling for permanent school specific effects to address the issue identified in the existing literature of better principals being sorted to specific types of schools. Third, we estimate a dynamic model that allows for lags in the effect that principals may have on student outcomes, as a new principal may take several years to have their full impact on a school. Our dynamic model can allow for quite flexible potential tenure effects, and adds to earlier findings that principal tenure or experience matter for student outcomes.

Our results suggest that there is sizable heterogeneity in school principal quality, particularly in affecting the grade 12 English exam scores of students. Specifically, getting a principal who is one standard deviation better in the principal effects distribution implies that graduation rates will be higher by 2.6 percentage points (or, roughly, a third of a standard deviation of the cross-school graduation rate distribution) and English exam scores will be higher by 2.5 percentage points (roughly equivalent to a standard deviation) if principals are given time to fully “make their mark” on the school. Our empirical strategies, however, come at the expense of not being able to identify the particular pathways through which principals affect student outcomes nor the strategies employed by effective principals. Thus, this paper represents a first step toward a more complete understanding of the role principals play in affecting student outcomes.

The outline of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we describe the BC school environment.

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<sup>5</sup>Authors et al (2007) employed school principals as instruments for high school graduation when investigating the effect of graduation on subsequent welfare use for youth from welfare backgrounds.

We outline the empirical models in section 3 and describe the administrative data we employ in section 4. We provide semi-parametric lower bound estimates of the variance of principal quality assuming principals have a constant immediate effect on schools in section 5 and estimates from our dynamic model of school principal effects in section 6. Section 7 concludes.

## **2 The Environment**

The data we employ is BC Ministry of Education administrative data on all youth enrolled in grade 12 in public schools at the start of November in the period 1995 to 2004. Private schools are not a substantial factor in BC, with only 7.5% of grade 12 students attending private high schools in 2002 (Authors et al (2007)). Students in BC obtain a high school diploma if they complete 80 credits at the grade 10 or higher level, including a certain number of required credits, and with 16 credits being at the grade 12 level. A typical student enters grade 12 having to pass five more courses (worth 20 credits) to graduate. The only required grade 12 level course is English 12. In June of the grade 12 year, students are required to take a province-wide exam in English 12 which counts for 40% of their English grade. Students do not have to pass the exam in order to pass their English course. We have the student scores on the provincial English exam for those who took it and we know whether a student has obtained their graduation diploma by the end of our data period (2005), though we focus on graduation within one or two years of their registration in grade 12 in order to maintain comparability across years. Approximately 82% of the students in our data graduate within 2 years of entering grade 12, indicating that a substantial proportion drop out even after starting grade 12. A Canadian version of the GED is available for students who drop out of high school but it is not a widely used option.<sup>6</sup>

As mentioned in the introduction, the expansion of high stakes student assessments in the

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<sup>6</sup>In Statistics Canada surveys, approximately 7.5% of 20 to 24 year old individuals report that they have not completed high school in BC in our period, though this is likely to be something of an understatement of the true drop-out level (Bowlby (2005)).

U.S. has led to investigations of whether the associated incentives have led to various forms of questionable responses. These range from “teaching to the test” to outright cheating on test completion and putting weak students in categories where they do not get assessed. While some of these responses appear to occur at the teacher level (Jacob and Levitt (2003)), others are at the level of principals or other administrators (e.g. Figlio (2006), McNeil et al (2008)). Principal cheating on the outcomes we examine seems unlikely in BC for several reasons. First, both principal compensation and school resources are set according to provincial guidelines based on factors such as school size, but neither are linked to student outcomes (BC Ministry of Education (2008), Beresford and Fussell (2009)). Second, the grade 12 provincial English exam is marked centrally, leaving little opportunity for local manipulation. Third, there is no opportunity for principals to manipulate enrolment to alter graduation rates since students are guaranteed enrolment in their “catchment area” school.

As we will see in the following sections, principal rotation across schools is a key input into our identification strategy. Principal rotation is determined at the school district level in BC. There are 55 school districts, each having a school board and a superintendent (the chief administrative officer). The number of high schools in a district ranges from a low of 1 to a high of 18. Each district has written policies posted on their web site. In 14 districts, corresponding to 37 percent of all high schools, principal rotation is explicitly mentioned in their district policies. The average number of high schools in districts with policies on principal rotation is 5.8 compared to 3.5 for those without, implying that it is the larger districts that tend to have explicit policies. For example, the Vancouver School Board (the largest district) has a policy which states, “It is the practice of the Board to transfer principals approximately every five years, although this period may be extended depending on special circumstances such as a principal nearing retirement”. Other districts have similar policies, with stated minimum and maximum times until rotation but also allowing some leeway in the application of the policy. In the districts without



explicit policies, some have policy statements declaring that Superintendents have power over these decisions and some have no statement at all. We contacted several of the smaller districts without explicit policies and were told that they simply had too few schools to have a regularized rotation system. The average number of years that we observe a principal leading a school in our data is 3.3 in districts with policies and 3.6 in districts without, so the policies do lead to more principal changes.<sup>7</sup> However, even districts without explicit policies have a considerable amount of turnover and rotation. Thus, there is good variation for us to work from.

The province of BC has one large city (Vancouver and its surrounding area), one smaller city (Victoria), and a wide rural expanse. Schools in the cities may be able to attract a wider pool of principal applicants due to the better amenities on offer to residents, so such schools may be able to hire on average a better quality of principal. Our estimation strategies (detailed below) employ within school variation in outcomes over time only, to avoid attributing school differences to principals. Variation in principal quality may in fact be larger across schools than within schools over time. As a result, our estimates of principal effectiveness are likely to be a lower bound on the effect of principals on schools.

As noted above, explicit principal rotation policies were more common in school districts with more schools. Such districts are more common in the cities. As a result, there were some differences in student and school attributes between schools with and without rotation policies. Students in schools with explicit principal rotation policies were more likely to be English as a Second Language (ESL) students, less likely to be of First Nation background, more likely to live in wealthier and more educated neighbourhoods, and more likely to be in larger schools. Note, however, that the student outcomes we investigate were only marginally better in schools

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<sup>7</sup>Note that these average years leading a school numbers understate the total number of years principals lead schools in BC as many of our observed principal spells are censored due to the ten year data window we observe. Employing standard survival time estimation techniques to deal with right censored spells (left censored spells were dropped), the estimated mean number of years a principal leads a school is 4.6 years in districts with rotation policies, and 6.6 years in the remaining districts.

with principal rotation policies.

### 3 Empirical Models of Student Outcomes

#### 3.1 General Model

We begin by setting out a simple heuristic model of high school graduation with the intention of using it to discuss estimation issues. Many of the points raised in this discussion will carry over to consideration of exam scores and we will return to this outcome at the end of this section. We think of the graduation outcome as the reflection of an optimizing decision by the student in which he or she compares the effort costs of completing courses to the expected benefits. Inputs from families and schools can reduce the effort (or the dis-utility of the effort) required to get a passing grade. Families, peers and neighbors can all have effects on perceptions of benefits from graduation. Principals may have impacts through their effectiveness in marshalling school resources, including teachers, and through motivation. Based on this, consider a simple regression in which an indicator for whether an individual  $i$  in cohort  $t$  at school  $s$  graduates from high school,  $G_{ist}$ , is written as a linear function of school ( $\delta$ ), principal ( $\theta$ ) and individual ( $\gamma$ ) effects, plus a random error term ( $v$ ), assumed to be independent of the other three components.

$$G_{ist} = \delta_s + \theta_{st} + \gamma_{ist} + v_{ist} \quad (1)$$

We will estimate this equation using two different assumptions about how  $\theta$  varies over time, set out in the two subsections that follow. Our goal is to identify these principal effects, and we discuss the assumptions required for identification in detail below. The school fixed effect will capture features of the school that are persistent within our ten year time period. Thus, this will include features such as persistently high levels of parental involvement and persistently high or low peer quality as well as physical attributes of the school. It is worth noting that with

school operating and capital funding coming from the province based on fixed formulas, there is little room for persistent differences in most school resources (though, an effective principal may be one who is better at finding ways to get extra resources from the province). We view the individual effect,  $\gamma$ , as reflecting a combination of: neighborhood (where the neighborhood is smaller than the school catchment area); demographic factors such as gender, aboriginal status and language spoken at home; parental inputs of time and other resources; impacts of peers; and individual cognitive and non-cognitive abilities.<sup>8</sup> In section 4, we describe a set of covariates that we include in order to capture some of these factors. The  $v$  term also includes all other unobserved factors affecting graduation such as shocks to the school environment.<sup>9</sup>

The key identification issues we face involve separating principal effects from general school effects, and from variation in the quality of the student cohorts that enter the school during their regime. We address the first issue by using school fixed effects. Thus, our identification will come from variation within schools which have multiple principals in our data period. Systematic assignment of principals with particular characteristics to perennially better schools is not a problem within this identification strategy. Since all principals within a given school would be assigned based on the perennial quality of the school, comparisons among them will not reflect any systematic bias. Similarly, students who move in order to attend perennially better schools are not a problem. Problems would arise, however, if principals were assigned to schools based on changes in the quality of students across cohorts or if students change schools in order to get a specific principal. In either case, what we interpret as a principal effect in improving student outcomes could really be a selection effect. We have no way to test whether these selection

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<sup>8</sup>All of these factors have been the focus of a considerable body of research on what affects schooling outcomes. See for example, Carneiro et al. (2003), Todd and Wolpin (2003), and Author et al. (2009) on the impacts of abilities, family background and peers on graduation and test score outcomes. Foley (2010) examines the impact of neighborhoods on youth educational outcomes in Canada, controlling for school and family inputs. Friesen and Krauth (forthcoming) examine the important issue of peer effects on aboriginal student outcomes in BC.

<sup>9</sup>The assumption that  $v$  is independent of the other factors is innocuous. It means that if there are shocks that are correlated with a given principal, we incorporate those into the principal effect. What is left in the error, then, are the remaining, orthogonal shocks.

mechanisms are at work. However, apart from students attending specialized programs, there is very little tendency for students to attend schools outside their catchment area, and we are not aware of any information indicating that principals are assigned based on anticipated changes in cohort quality. Thus, we believe that the key identifying assumption of no systematic selection with respect to changes in cohort quality is reasonable.

It is worth noting that we examine graduation rates for students who register in grade 12 in the fall of a school year. The legal school leaving age is 16 in BC and there is dropping out in grade 11. Thus, the students in our sample are a select group. This may have an impact on our results if principals differ in when they have an impact on students. Thus, a principal who is good at keeping students from dropping out in grade 11 but doesn't maintain that impact in grade 12 may have a relatively low graduation rate by our measure. We have no way to address this issue and so must assume that a principal who is able to get students to stay in school in grade 11 is also able to keep them in school in grade 12. Our exam grades measure is for a population that is one step more selected, since the exam is only taken by students who have not dropped out before June of their grade 12 year. Again, if principals are effective in keeping students in school but not in improving their grades then this could result in downward biased estimates of principal effects on exam grades. Note that we explore the issue of dropping out of school prior to Grade 12 further below.

We next turn to presenting two estimators of principal impacts on student outcomes which are based on two different assumptions about the dynamics of the principal effect  $\theta_{st}$ .

### **3.2 Model with Time Invariant Principal Effects**

Our first approach is to use a variant of the estimator that Rivkin et al (2005) use to study the impacts of teachers. Under this approach, we assume that each principal has a time invariant "effect" which he or she imposes on the school which they head. Note that we do not restrict

this “effect” to be the same in each school a particular principal leads. Any principal may have different sized and even signed effects in different schools as they may follow a better or worse principal than themselves. The principal is able to impose this effect immediately upon taking over a school. Thus, what we will call the leadership effect in school  $s$  in a given year equals the time invariant impact for the principal in charge in that year. We can express this as  $\theta_{st} = \theta_p$ , where  $p$  indexes the principal who is in charge of school  $s$  in year  $t$ .

To set out this estimator, we begin by forming the average graduation probability for students in year  $t$  in school  $s$ :

$$\bar{G}_{st} = \delta_s + \theta_{st} + \bar{\gamma}_{st} + \bar{v}_{st} \quad (2)$$

We can then compare the mean outcome of an individual student cohort to the average outcome of the school over our observation period.

$$(\bar{G}_{st} - \bar{G}_s) = (\theta_{st} - \bar{\theta}_s) + (\bar{\gamma}_{st} - \bar{\gamma}_s) + (\bar{v}_{st} - \bar{v}_s) \quad (3)$$

In equation 3, all fixed school effects ( $\delta_s$ ) have been removed by subtracting school mean outcomes. Thus, deviations in the mean outcome of a particular cohort from the school mean is a function of deviations in principal effects from the school average principal effect, deviations in average student quality from the school average student quality, and a remaining composite random error component.

Squaring both sides of equation 3 yields equation 4.

$$(\bar{G}_{st} - \bar{G}_s)^2 = (\theta_{st} - \bar{\theta}_s)^2 + (\bar{\gamma}_{st} - \bar{\gamma}_s)^2 + 2(\bar{\gamma}_{st}\theta_{st} + \bar{\gamma}_s\bar{\theta}_s - \bar{\gamma}_s\theta_{st} - \bar{\gamma}_{st}\bar{\theta}_s) + (\bar{v}_{st} - \bar{v}_s)^2 \quad (4)$$

Equation 4 characterizes the squared deviations in mean student outcomes as a sum of terms corresponding to the within school variance in principal effects, within school variation in average student quality, the covariance between average student quality deviations and principal quality deviations within a school, and a final component equal to the variation in  $v$ .<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>Note that we have made use of the fact that  $v$  is defined such that it is independent of the other factors in the model.

We calculate the average of these squared deviations in student outcomes within each school to form a measure of the within school variance in student outcomes. The average is taken over  $T$ , the total number of years we observe the school in our sample. Taking expectations of this measure of the within school variance in student outcomes, employing equation 4, yields equation 5.

$$E \left[ \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T (\bar{G}_{st} - \bar{G}_s)^2 \right] = E \left[ \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T (\theta_{st} - \bar{\theta}_s)^2 \right] + \sigma_{\bar{\gamma}_s}^2 + \sigma_{\bar{\gamma}_s \theta_{st}} + \sigma_v^2 \quad (5)$$

where,  $\sigma_{\bar{\gamma}_s}^2$  is the variance of cohort average quality of students in a school,  $\sigma_{\bar{\gamma}_s \theta_{st}}$  is the covariance between deviations in cohort average quality and deviations in principal effectiveness, and  $\sigma_v^2$  is the variance of the idiosyncratic term.

Equation 6 defines the expectation of our term of interest, the term capturing the within school variance of school principal effects. We denote this variance as  $\sigma_{\theta_s}^2$ , where  $\sigma_{\theta_s}^2 = E[\theta_p^2]$ . Assuming that each principal is an independent random draw, such that  $E[\theta_p \theta_k] = 0$  where  $p \neq k$ ,

$$E \left[ \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T (\theta_{st} - \bar{\theta}_s)^2 \right] = \sigma_{\theta_s}^2 \left[ \frac{1}{n} \sum_{p=1}^P q_p \left[ 1 + \frac{1}{n^2} \sum_{k=1}^P q_k^2 - \frac{2}{n} q_p \right] \right] \quad (6)$$

The term on the right hand side of equation 6 after  $\sigma_{\theta_s}^2$  is a deterministic number denoting the amount of school principal turnover within one school  $s$ . Details of the construction of this turnover term, including a simple example, are provided in Appendix A. The number  $q_p$  denotes the number of years that principal  $p$  is in the school, while  $P$  denotes the total number of different principals in the school over the period.

While this turnover term looks quite complicated, it collapses to easily understood numbers in most cases. If the same principal leads the school for the entire sample period, this term will equal zero. If there are multiple principals in charge over the period, the turnover term will be positive and increasing in the number of principals (the amount of principal turnover). For example, if there are two principals in the school over the period, each one for the same number

of years, then the turnover term equals one half. If there are three principals for equal numbers of years, the term equals two thirds. The intuition behind this equation is that if principals affect student outcomes and there is variability in quality across school principals, the within school variance in student outcomes should be higher in schools with more principals.

The variance of cohort average quality of students in a school,  $\sigma_{\gamma_s}^2$ , will be proportional to the inverse of the number of students in the school since year to year variation will be higher in smaller schools. We control for this effect in our estimates by including the inverse of school size in our estimating equation. As written, equation 5 employs an assumption that the variance in student quality at the individual student level ( $\sigma_\gamma^2$ ) is the same in all schools. We discuss that assumption in more detail below.

Our primary estimating equation for the time invariant principal effects model is equation 5, after substituting in equation 6. The dependent variable is the variance in student outcomes across cohorts within each school. We regress this variance on the term we construct to denote principal turnover (the summation term on the right hand side of equation 6), plus the inverse of the average size of the grade 12 entering cohort in the school. The coefficient on the turnover term corresponds to the within school variance of principal effects  $\sigma_{\theta_s}^2$ . An estimate of zero for that variance would imply that all principals have the same effect on graduation. This would not necessarily imply that principals are unimportant (i.e., that removing all principals would not affect student outcomes), but it would mean that heterogeneity in effectiveness across principals could not help explain why some students graduate and others do not.

The key question, of course, is what are the identifying assumptions needed for estimation of this equation by OLS to yield consistent estimates of  $\sigma_{\theta_s}^2$ . As always, this depends crucially on what is in the error term. In this regard, the assumption of a linearly additive school effect,  $\delta_s$ , in equation 1 is crucial since it implies that effects having to do with the school are completely eliminated when considering the variance of outcomes within a school over time. Intuitively,

this specification allows for systematic assignment of principals with particular characteristics to perennially better schools. Since all principals within a given school would be assigned based on the perennial quality of the school, comparisons among them will not reflect any systematic bias. It would be problematic if principals were assigned based on, say, trends in school quality since the error term in our estimating equation would then include a school specific term correlated with the principal quality term. The policies on principal rotation that can be observed for BC school districts do not mention worsening or improving conditions at a school as a specific criteria to use in rotation decisions but we have still attempted to check the importance of this assumption. In particular, we checked to see whether new principals tended to enter schools that had, on average, lower outcomes just before the principal change (i.e., a type of "Ashenfelter dip"). As described in footnote 19, we found no evidence of such a pattern. Another similar assumption is that the covariance between principal quality and changes in cohort ability levels ( $\sigma_{\bar{\gamma}_s \theta_{st}}$  in equation 5) is zero. This implies that students cannot be changing schools in order to get a specific principal. Again, given the first assumption, it is allowable that they move to access a perennially better school. We believe that this is a reasonable assumption given that there does not appear to be a substantial amount of knowledge on the part of parents about differences across principals and when they will move in BC, though there is discussion about what schools tend to be perennially better. A third identifying assumption used in formulating equation 6 is that an individual principal's effects are immediate and time invariant. We relax this assumption in our second estimator. Finally, given these assumptions what remains in the error term in our specification is the within-school variance of the year-to-year idiosyncratic term,  $\nu$ . Our final identifying assumption is that this does not vary across schools. This assumption, in particular, precludes there being different year to year volatility in average student quality in schools with different levels of principal turnover but the same school size. If this were violated then the estimated principal effect would partly reflect this volatility. Readers may be concerned



that a correlation of this type could arise if districts with poor student outcomes (and therefore potentially a high inherent relative student outcome volatility) are also the ones that tend to use explicit principal rotation policies. As noted in the Environment Section, student outcomes were actually marginally better in districts with explicit rotation policies, thus this concern seems unwarranted.

Overall, our assessment is that the identifying assumptions required to obtain a consistent estimate of  $\sigma_{\theta_s}^2$  are reasonable, with the main potential assumption of a time invariant principal effect. We turn to an estimator that relaxes this assumption next. Before leaving this estimator, though, it is worth noting that because it removes all across school variation in school principal effects, it generates a lower bound estimate of the overall variance in principal effects. If all schools hired from a common pool of potential school principals, across school variation in average principal quality would be zero. If, however, certain schools can hire from a larger pool of applicants, by offering, say, more advantageous living and working conditions, the average quality of those hired should be higher. Thus there may be considerable cross-school variation in principal quality that we do not capture here.

There may also be an upward bias in our estimate of the variance of principal effects if there is non-random attrition of principals from the BC public high school system (Rivkin et al, 2005). We observe principal turnover from both rotation of principals across schools and from principals leaving the public school sector. If only good or bad principals leave, and new hires are drawn randomly from the distribution, turnover will be related to the distribution of principal effects in a school. Consider, for example, a school that gets a good draw from the principal distribution, raising student outcomes. If that principal leaves, and the next principal is drawn randomly, turnover and quality deviations will be related. More turnover will be observed in schools that have a wider distribution in principal effects.

Our estimator is derived from the one developed by Rivkin et al (2005) to examine het-

erogeneity in teacher effects. There are, however, two important differences. First, we cannot difference out the individual student fixed effect as we only observe individuals once in our data: the year they enter grade 12. This is the reason we need the assumption (which is stronger than theirs) that changes in cohort quality are not correlated with principal heterogeneity. Secondly, our estimator is based on the within-school variance in student outcomes, and uses the school as the unit of observation. The Rivkin et al (2005) estimator uses first differences in student achievement within a school and grade, and uses individual cohorts within a school as the unit of observation. Our choice was purposeful as principals may take some time before making noticeable changes to a school. A first differencing technique will only identify the immediate effect of a new principal on a school, potentially missing more important medium term effects. The fact that our interest is at the school rather than the grade level is also advantageous because we do not face selection problems related to the allocation of students across classrooms. The latter allocation is actually part of what an effective principal will do and, so, a part of what we are trying to measure.

### **3.3 Model with Dynamic Principal Effects**

As we noted in the previous subsection, one key identifying assumption underlying the first estimator is that the impact of principals on student outcomes are immediate and constant year to year. In this section, we describe an estimator that relaxes this assumption. In particular, it seems possible that a principal may not have his or her full impact on a school until after having led the school for several years. It may take time to replace under-performing teachers, to implement new discipline procedures or change learning objectives. If we do not take this into account (as our first estimator does not), this would imply a downward bias in the estimate of the variance of potential principal effects. In particular, in a school where principals turn over often, no principal would be able to effect real change and we would conclude that principals have little

effect on student outcomes. This may be the correct conclusion in a system where principals do not stay at any school for very long but it could under-state the true impact principals can have given time. Our second estimator is designed to allow us to get at this latter potential impact and to estimate how long it would take a typical principal to achieve his or her potential. Note also that if principals do take time to affect a school, and districts have regularly rotated principals across schools (as many have in BC), our time invariant estimator would be biased down due to this rotation policy.

We now construct a simple model that allows for each principal to have a cumulative effect (positive or negative) on student outcomes over time. We start with the same linear equation describing average student outcomes in a school and cohort as above (Equation 2) but now allow for the school leadership effect,  $\theta_{st}$ , to be a weighted average of the school leadership effect in the previous year,  $\theta_{s,t-1}$ , and of the “full” individual school principal effect,  $\theta_p$ , of the current principal, with weight parameter  $\rho$ :

$$\theta_{st} = \rho \theta_{s,t-1} + (1 - \rho) \theta_{pt} \quad (7)$$

Under this model, if principal  $p$  was left to run the school for many years, the leadership effect  $\theta_{st}$  would approach  $\theta_p$ . While this model is simple, it captures potential principal dynamics in a tractable manner. We also investigated more flexible models of leadership dynamics but with only 9 years of data, we did not have enough variation to effectively identify them.

Substituting Equation 7 into Equation 2 yields the following,

$$\bar{G}_{st} = \delta_s + \rho \theta_{s,t-1} + (1 - \rho) \theta_{pt} + \nu_{st} \quad (8)$$

where  $\nu_{st} = \bar{\gamma}_{st} + \bar{v}_{st}$  is a composite error term.

To construct our estimator of this model of principal effects, we first rewrite 7 as,

$$\theta_{st} = \rho \theta_{s,t-1} + (1 - \rho) \lambda'_s D_{st} \quad (9)$$

where,  $\lambda_s$  is a  $P_s \times 1$  vector the elements of which are the full effects,  $\theta_p$ , for all principals at school  $s$ , and  $D_{st}$  is a  $P_s \times 1$  vector with an entry of 1 in the element corresponding to the principal in place in school  $s$  in year  $t$  and zeros in all other rows.

Repeated back substitution of this equation yields:

$$\theta_{st} = \rho^t \theta_{s,0} + (1 - \rho) \sum_{j=0}^{t-1} \rho^j D'_{s,t-j} \lambda_s \quad (10)$$

We set  $\rho^t \theta_{s,0}$  to zero. This imposes the normalization that the effect of leadership in the school in the year just prior to the data period we observe is zero in each school. We also normalize our principal effects by setting the parameter for the full principal effect of the first principal observed in each school to zero. As a result, all other full principal effects are estimated relative to the first principal. We make this normalisation because by including school fixed effects, the effects of all principals observed in a school are not separately identified.

The estimated model is a panel (by school) of non-linear in parameters regressions with common  $\rho$ :

$$\bar{G}_{st} = \delta_s + (1 - \rho) \sum_{j=0}^{t-1} \rho^j D'_{s,t-j} \lambda_s + \nu_{st} = X_{st}(\rho)' \beta_s + \nu_{st} \quad (11)$$

This can be estimated by non-linear least squares. In practice, we estimate the parameters using an iterative procedure as follows. For a given value of  $\rho$ , equation 11 is linear in the remaining parameters and we can obtain estimates of  $\delta_s$  and the  $\lambda_s$ 's by OLS. We can then search for values of  $\rho$  (with their associated values of  $\delta_s$  and the  $\lambda_s$ 's) that minimize,

$$\min_{\rho} \sum_{s=1}^N \sum_{t=1}^T \nu_{st}(\rho)^2 \quad \text{where} \quad \nu_{st}(\rho) = \bar{G}_{st} - X_{st}(\rho)' \hat{\beta}_s(\rho) \quad (12)$$

Note that both this model and the time invariant leadership effects model above assume an unobserved component for each principal that affects student outcomes additively and linearly. In both cases, school fixed effects are allowed for, so only within school variation in principal effects are estimated. The assumptions required for this estimator to provide consistent estimates are the same as under the invariant effects model, with the key exception that the principal effect

can vary with tenure, i.e., we require that school effects enter additively, that the covariance between cohort variation and principal variation within a school is zero, and that the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks is the same across schools. We are able to examine the assumption that school effects take a time invariant form by allowing for school specific trends. The results from that exercise are presented in section 6 and do not indicate substantial differences from what we obtain without the added trends. Of course, relaxing the assumption of time-invariant principal effects comes at the cost of assuming a specific, partial adjustment model of the over-time effects of principals. As before, our estimates can be interpreted as lower bound estimates of the true principal effects. Note also that the dynamic model nests a standard fixed effects model of principal effects, when  $\rho$  equals zero.

With the dynamic effects model, a principal has an initial impact of  $(1 - \rho)$  times his or her full unobserved effect. In year  $k$ , the principal's effect equals  $(1 - \rho) \sum_{j=0}^{k-1} \rho^j = (1 - \rho^k)$  times his or her full effect. The estimator yields an estimate of  $(1-\rho)$  (the speed by which principals affect schools), plus estimates of the full unobserved principal effects. Given this set of estimated unobserved effects, we can calculate the variance of both the full effects and of the year by year impacts of principals on schools.

## 4 The Data

As we stated earlier, our data comes from administrative records on all youth enrolled at the start of November in grade 12 of standard public (provincially funded) British Columbia high schools from 1995 to 2004. For each grade 12 student, we observe whether and when they graduated from high school, as long as it occurred before October 2005. We also observe the high school the individual attended, from which we can identify the principal at the school when the student was in grade 12. In addition, we observe the score the student achieved in the provincially set

English final exam if the student took the exam <sup>11</sup>

The administrative school records contain information on each student's birth month and year, from which we can construct a variable denoting the student's age in months. Students entering grade twelve at older ages are those that either repeated a grade of school earlier on or entered school at a later age than normal. The records also contain information on gender, first nation status, whether they are an English as a Second Language student, plus information on the language spoken at home. We include all of these as covariates in our estimation in a manner described in section 4.1.

From 1996 onwards, the data also includes the student's home postal code. Using this information, we link individual student records to 2001 Census information on the characteristics of the Census Tract or Subdivision (neighborhood) where the student lives. Census tracts are small geographic areas that contain roughly 2,500 to 8,000 people. In Vancouver, a typical high school catchment area covers at least parts of about 4 Census tracts. Thus, neighborhood variables have variation even after controlling for the school. <sup>12</sup> Our set of neighborhood variables includes: the proportion of families headed by a lone parent; the average number of rooms in a housing unit; the proportion of homes that are rented; the proportion who speak a language other than English at home; the proportion who are immigrants; the proportion First Nations; the unemployment rate; the proportion with less than a grade 9 education; the proportion who are university educated; the proportion with another post-secondary degree; the average family income; and the average value of dwellings. Since we do not have direct information on the income or education level of the students' parents, the Census information provide an indirect means of controlling

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<sup>11</sup>We also observe marks in provincial Math and Communications exams but these exams are not mandatory and are only taken by a subset of students.

<sup>12</sup>We use Census Tract level information where such tracts are identified (the majority of urban areas), and information at the Census Subdivision level if Census Tracts are not defined or have populations that are too small to measure neighborhood characteristics with an appropriate level of accuracy (less than 250 people). In a small number of cases, characteristics are measured at the Census Division level if both Tract and Subdivision information are not available or are unreliable due to small populations.

for missing family background characteristics on student outcomes.

One piece of information we do not have in our data that has been shown to be important in other work (e.g., Rivkin et al. (2005)) is the identity of teachers. To the extent that principals are able to select their set of teachers, we will attribute their effects to principals. If a particular school is perennially desirable, perhaps because of the neighborhoods it draws students from, and attracts better teachers throughout our period, then the school effect will reflect teacher effects to some extent. Otherwise, individual teacher effects will become part of the error term. This affects the interpretation of our estimated principal effects since we essentially give principals credit for the actions of the team they assemble.

We focus exclusively on students attending standard public high schools. Focusing on public schools also minimizes resource differences across schools since funding levels for all public schools are set by the BC Provincial government. We also restrict attention to high schools with at least 25 students in each grade 12 entering cohort when analyzing graduation rates. This restriction was undertaken to limit noise in the estimates of mean graduation rates by school and cohort. When analyzing English Grade 12 exam scores, we further limit attention to schools that had at least 25 students writing such exams each year.

We construct two separate indicators of high school graduation from the data. The first measure (1 year) denotes high school graduation as occurring if the student graduated by October of the year after the student was identified as being enrolled in grade 12 (measured in November), giving individuals about a year to complete high school. Under a typical time-line, a student would graduate in June. The second measure (2 year) denotes high school graduation occurring if the student graduated before October two years after being enrolled in grade 12, giving students an extra year by which to graduate. Only a very small number of students complete high school after these times. For our purposes, such students would be denoted as non-school completers. If they did complete high school at later stages, this was often completed outside of regular public

high schools in specific continuing education institutions.

One potential shortcoming of our data is that we do not have information on dropping out of high school before grade 12 even though, with a legal school leaving age of 16, dropping out after grade 10 is possible for most students. This introduces potential difficulties because a good principal may induce students not to drop out before grade 12 (when our data starts). If these marginal students are weaker scholastically and/or are more likely to drop out in grade 12 then a good principal who has encouraged students to stay in school longer may appear to be a bad principal by the grade 12 outcome measures. Given actual rates of dropping out before grade 11 for most students, however, we do not believe this is an issue. Aman (2009) reports school leaving and graduation rates using administrative data for three cohorts of children who entered kindergarten in the early 1990s. For much of her analysis, she divides students into Aboriginal (constituting 10% of kindergarten students), English as a Second Language (ESL - making up 20%), and Regular students (constituting the remaining 70%). Among Regular students, she shows that only 2% left school after each of grade 10 and grade 11.<sup>13</sup> With approximately 81% of Regular students who enter grade 12 graduating from high school, this implies that nearly all the dropping out for these students happens in grade 12. In comparison, for Aboriginal students, approximately 6% leave school after grade 10, with another 11% leaving after grade 11. Their grade 12 graduation rate is between 34% and 51%, depending on whether they are living On-Reserve. For ESL students 1% leave school after grade 10, 7% leave after grade 11, and 84% graduate conditional on entering grade 12. Thus, while there is not likely to be an issue with pre-grade 12 dropping out for Regular students, there is potentially an issue for ESL and, especially, Aboriginal students. For most of our results, we include all three types of students in our sample (though, we do include controls for Aboriginal and ESL students). However, in section 6, we

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<sup>13</sup>Since "school leaving" in Aman's data includes both leaving the province and dropping out, these are upper bounds on drop out rates. One percent of Regular students leave school after grade 9. Given that this is before the legal drop-out age, this provides an estimate of the amount of school leaving that is not dropping out.



present some results for the non-Aboriginal, non-ESL sample to assess whether dropping out before grade 12 for the minority groups is affecting our results.

For the graduation outcomes, our final sample covers 224 schools. Of the 224 schools, 22 had only one principal over the period, another 77 had two, 87 had three, 29 had four, and 9 had five principals. Note that a small number of the schools were not observed over the full 10 year period as new schools were opened in British Columbia, and some were closed. In all, we observe 504 separate principals in our set of schools over the period. We observe 127 (25 per cent) of these principals in more than one school (114 in two schools, 13 in three). These switching principals are observed for an average of 3.3 years in each school. For 97 of these switching principals, they were observed only in schools within the same school district. Thus we observe significant rotation of principals across schools, particularly within school districts. There is also significant principal turnover, unrelated to rotation, due to new principals entering and others leaving the BC public high school system. Approximately 37 % of all turnovers are due purely to rotation (switching principals).

Summary statistics by school are provided in Table 1. On average, 78 per cent of entering grade 12 students graduate from high school within one year, 82 per cent within two. Average graduation rates varied significantly across these public high schools, from a low of 35 to a high of 93 per cent. The across school distribution of mean graduation rates is presented in Figure 1. Note that the distribution of graduation rates is skewed to the left, with most schools having graduation rates around 0.8, but some schools having quite low graduation rates. Given this distribution, when we construct our estimates of principal effects below, we use the log odds of graduation rates  $\ln[G/(1 - G)]$  as our outcome measure rather than graduation rates in levels  $G$ .

We have data for 209 schools that had at least 25 students write the grade 12 English Exam each year. The across school distribution of mean English exam scores is presented in Figure 2. This distribution is approximately bell-shaped, with no apparent skewness. Given this, we anal-

Table 1: Statistics by School

	mean	s.d.	min	max
Graduation rate (1 year)	0.78	0.08	0.35	0.93
Graduation rate (2 years)	0.82	0.07	0.41	0.95
English Exam Scores (per cent)	68.9	2.6	61.7	75.7
Number of students per year	208.3	116.4	31.5	667.9
Male	0.51	0.03	0.32	0.66
First Nation	0.06	0.09	0.00	0.69
English as second language	0.05	0.08	0.00	0.37
English	0.84	0.20	0.19	1.00
French	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02
Other language	0.16	0.20	0.00	0.81
Age (months)	213.7	5.7	209.7	278.7

Notes: 224 observations (schools) except for the English Exam Scores, where only 209 schools were included. Averages over period 1995 to 2004 or less if school not in existence for whole period.

Figure 1: School Mean Graduation Rate Distribution - 1 year





Figure 2: **School Mean English Scores Distribution**



use these exam scores in levels in the analysis below.

#### **4.1 Controlling for individual characteristics**

Before employing the two estimation techniques described above, we remove the influence of a number of available individual, peer and neighborhood characteristics along with aggregate time effects from our outcome measures using first stage estimations. The first stage is performed using the Logit technique for the graduation measures and OLS for the Grade 12 English Exam Scores. The coefficient estimates from these first stage estimations are collected in Appendix Tables B1, B2 and B3. Summary statistics for these variables are presented in Table B4. We construct three sets of first stage regressions for each outcome measure. In Table B1, we control for aggregate time effects only (an indicator for each year except 1995). In Table B2, we control for time, individual and peer effects, where the peer characteristics are measured as the proportion of students in the same school and year (except oneself) with that particular characteristic.

In Table B3, we control for time, individual, peer and neighborhood effects. For each of two estimators, we will refer to estimates where the first stage includes only time effects as the Base estimates; those controlling for time, individual and peer effects as the Adjusted I estimates; and those also controlling for neighborhood effects the Adjusted II estimates.<sup>14</sup>

Table B1 indicates the presence of strong aggregate time effects for all three student outcome measures. The Logit coefficients imply an 8 percentage point growth in graduation rates over the period from 1995 to 2004 for the 1 year measure.<sup>15</sup> There is also a 3 percentage point growth in average English exam scores, all of which occurred after 1999. This is a period when BC, in contrast to the rest of Canada, faced labour market difficulties. It is also a period in which access to Social Assistance was reduced and the government expanded the number of seats in BC universities. Any or all of these events may underlie the upward graduation trend.

When controlling for individual characteristics (Table B2), we include a male indicator plus its interaction with the other five individual characteristics observed. Although the coefficient on the male indicator itself is positive, when we take into account the influence of the interactions (particularly the interaction with age, which is measured in months), being male significantly lowers the probability of graduating from high school and lowers English exam scores. Being of a First Nations background and being an English as a Second Language (ESL) student lowers the probability of graduation by approximately 20 percentage points. French speakers have a 6 percentage point lower probability of graduation, while speaking a language other than English or French at home is associated with an increase in the probability of graduation of about 4 percentage points. Being one year older than the average student is associated with a 10 percentage

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<sup>14</sup>Note that when controlling for neighborhood characteristics, we lose one year of data (1995), as individual student postcode information was not collected until 1996. We also lose a very small number of students (0.4 of one per cent of all students) for whom we were unable to link their home postal code to the Census data, or the home postal code was not provided.

<sup>15</sup>The smaller estimate on the 2004 indicator in the estimates for the 2 year measure of graduation is due to our administrative data ending in 2005. Thus those students entering grade 12 in 2004 cannot be observed for a full two years, so graduation rates are lower for that entering cohort using this measure.

point lower probability of graduation.

We construct peer quality measures for each individual student by calculating the average of the individual characteristics for all other students in the same school and cohort (year). For example, we calculate the proportion of a student's classmates that came from a First Nation background, but do not include the individual student themselves in the calculation.<sup>16</sup> The estimated peer effects in Table B2 indicate that having more male, First Nation and "Other" home language speakers in a student's class are all associated with a lower probability of graduation. Having more ESL students in a class is actually associated with a higher graduation probability.

When we add neighborhood characteristics in Table B3, we find that many of them enter significantly and, mostly, with expected signs. Two variables have an unexpected effect. Having a higher proportion of the population with less than a grade 9 education is associated with better student outcomes. Having a higher average value of dwellings is associated with worse student outcomes. This particular unexpected effect disappears, however, if the highly correlated average income variable is dropped from the estimation.

## **5 Estimates assuming Time Invariant Principal Effects**

We begin with the results from the Rivkin et al (2005) based technique for constructing estimates of the within-school variance in principal fixed effects. Recall that this estimator is based on the idea that within-school variation in student outcomes should be higher in schools that have several principals over a period than in schools with only one principal over the same length of

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<sup>16</sup>We could also include the endogenous peer measures (graduation rates and average exam scores) for the rest of the students but choose not to do so because of the well-known "reflection" identification problem (Manski, 1993; Brock and Durlauf, 2001). Since we do not have an extensive set of individual controls (including, among other possibilities, measures of earlier school achievement), we face the possibility that the peer variable effects we estimate actually reflect common, unobserved factors - what Manski calls the correlated effects problem. We are not primarily concerned with the peer effects and so do not consider this further. We just require that any such common unobserved effects (to the extent they are not correlated with the peer variables) are not correlated with changes in principals.

time.

As we discussed earlier, principals may take a number of years to make an impact on a school they are put in charge of, and this first estimator will have difficulty picking up such time varying effects. To investigate this issue, we construct our estimates of the variance of within-school principal effects for the whole sample of schools and for the sub-sample of schools where three or fewer principals lead the school over the period. By focussing on schools with fewer principals, each principal has more years to affect the school, making it easier for this estimator to identify the underlying variance in principal effects.

Estimates of the within-school variance in principal effects for our base and two adjusted measures of student outcomes are presented in Table 2. The base measure just removes time effects. The “adjusted I” measure controls for individual, peer and time effects, while the “Adjusted II” measure controls for individual, peer, time and neighborhood effects. When constructing these estimates for the graduation rate measures, we take deviations of actual mean graduation rates in log odds terms by school and cohort from predicted mean graduation rates from our first stage estimates, also in log odds terms. Estimates for all schools are presented in the top panel of the Table, while estimates for the sub-sample of schools with three or fewer principals leading the school over the period are presented in the bottom panel.

Our estimate of the variance in principal effects for the 1 year graduation rate measure is 0.020 controlling only for time effects and using all schools. Our preferred estimates, though, include the individual and neighbourhood controls to insure that our principal variable is not inadvertently picking up shifts in student composition. Using the Adjusted II control set, the estimated effects are very close to zero for the 1 year graduation rate but rise to 0.015 for the rate measured at 2 years. These estimates change little when we shift to the less than 3 principals sample. The fact that the effect is larger for the 2 year measure may imply that principal effects occur less through direct instigation to graduate among students in grade 12 than through

Table 2: Variance in Principal Quality: Time Invariant Effects Model

	coefficient	s.e.	observations
All Schools			
Grad. rate (1 yr) - base	0.020	0.037	224
- adjusted I	-0.002	0.033	224
- adjusted II	0.003	0.033	224
Grad. rate (2 yrs) - base	0.046	0.037	224
- adjusted I	0.022	0.032	224
- adjusted II	0.015	0.032	224
English Scores - base	2.17**	0.87	209
- adjusted I	1.02	0.87	209
- adjusted II	1.36	0.85	209
$\leq 3$ principals			
Grad. rate (1 yr) - base	0.033	0.039	186
- adjusted I	0.000	0.036	186
- adjusted II	0.001	0.035	189
Grad. rate (2 yrs) - base	0.067*	0.039	186
- adjusted I	0.032	0.035	186
- adjusted II	0.016	0.035	189
English Scores - base	2.42**	0.94	174
- adjusted I	1.43	0.97	174
- adjusted II	1.64*	0.94	177

*Notes:* Regressions also include a constant and the inverse of school grade 12 enrolment. One and two \*'s denotes statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels respectively.

longer reaching changes in attitudes. However, none of the adjusted estimates are statistically significantly different from zero or from each other at any conventional significance level.

One straightforward way to interpret the size of the estimates of the variance in principal effects for our graduation rate measures in log odds terms is as follows. Start from the mean graduation rate in the sample of 82 per cent for the 2 year measure. Using our variance of principal effects of 0.016 from the adjusted II specification in the bottom panel, getting a principal who is one standard deviation higher in the impact distribution implies an increase in the log odds of graduating of 0.126. An increase of 0.126 from the mean raises the probability of graduating by 1.8 percentage points. This appears to us to be a small, though certainly non-trivial effect. On the other hand, performing the same exercise using our estimated principal effects one year after the students enter grade 12 implies an increase in the probability of graduating by 0.5 percentage points.

We can use the model estimates to construct a decomposition of the variance in student outcomes across schools to give us an additional method for judging how much school principals can matter. To construct the decomposition, we return to expression 1 in which the graduation probability is written as a function of school fixed effects, principal effects, and a third main component encompassing student quality and other individual level shocks. Under our independence assumptions, we can then write the variance of the graduation rate across schools as the sum of the variances of these three broad components. To obtain estimates of each of the component variances, we turn to our within-school estimates. Thus, for the variance of the principal effects, we use our estimate from Table 2 under the (possibly heroic) assumption that the within and across school variances in principal effects are equal. Similarly, we construct our estimate of the variance of the student quality and shock component from our within-school estimates.

<sup>17</sup> We then calculate the across school variance in school effects as the raw across-school vari-

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<sup>17</sup>In particular, we calculate it by subtracting the implied average principal quality variation within schools (the across school average of the principal turnover term times our estimate of  $\sigma_{\theta}^2$ ) from the across school average of the



ance in student outcomes at a point in time (the year 2004) minus our estimates of the other two variance components. Using this approach with the estimates for the adjusted II graduation rate (2 year) and three or fewer principals, the cross-school variance in the log odds of graduation rates in 2004 of 0.28 can be decomposed into the effect of schools (59%), the effect of student quality variation and remaining shocks (35%), and to the effect of school principals (6%). Thus, the decomposition implies that school principals do not contribute much to overall variation in student graduation rates. Note that this decomposition is based on a rather imprecise estimate of  $\sigma_\theta^2$ . Using a 95% confidence interval around the 0.016 estimate results in decompositions implying school principals have no effect on graduation rates (an estimated but implausible negative effect of -19% on the cross school variance) up to a positive contribution of 31%.

For English exam scores, the estimates of the variance of principal effects are statistically significant at the 5 per cent level and sizable for the base measure. For the adjusted measures, the size of the estimates fall and only the estimate using the “adjusted II” measure and the subsample of schools with three or fewer principals is statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. A one standard deviation of within-school principal effects of 1.28 (if three or fewer principals run the school, i.e. the square root of 1.64) is quite large when compared to the standard deviation in adjusted mean English exam scores across schools of 1.82 percentage points. It implies that if a student attended a school that had a school principal that was one standard deviation higher in the “effective” distribution, their English exam score would be 1.28 percentage points higher.

We can use a similar decomposition approach to the one we used for graduation rates to decompose the variance in English exam scores across schools into the effects of schools, student quality and remaining shocks, and school principals. For the adjusted II measure of English exam scores and three or fewer principals, the cross-school variance in scores of 7.18 can be decomposed into the effect of schools (35%), the effect of student quality variation and remaining

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within school variance of student outcomes (i.e. the average of  $\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T (\bar{G}_{st} - \bar{G}_s)^2$  across schools).

shocks (42%), and to the effect of school principals (23%). Thus, school principals have a larger proportional effect on English exam scores than on graduation rates. Note again that this decomposition is based on a relatively imprecise estimate of  $\sigma_\theta^2$ . A 95% confidence interval around the principal contribution ranges from a low of no principal contribution to English scores (or -3%) up to a positive contribution of 49%.

To summarize these estimates, there is some evidence of principals affecting the student outcome of English exam scores, but only weak evidence of principals affecting graduation rates. In general, the point estimates are larger when the sample is restricted to schools that have three or fewer principals leading the school over the period. This provides potential support for the hypothesis that principals may take a number of years to affect a school. It is to this particular issue that we turn in the next section.

## **6 Estimates using Model allowing Dynamic Principal Effects**

In this section, we present the results from the model in which the effect of a school principal on student outcomes is allowed to grow over the time the principal is leading the school. The results include estimates of the speed at which a new principal affects student outcomes (the parameter  $(1-\rho)$ ), plus estimates of the unobserved “full” principal effects. Using these “full” principal effect estimates, we construct estimates of the overall variance of such effects. The estimates of the parameter on the speed of adjustment to the full principal effects provides information about whether principals do have effects on student outcomes. If  $(1-\rho)$  equals zero, then the “school leadership” effect does not change when new principals are introduced. In that case, the dynamics of the graduation rate or exam score would collapse to a school fixed effect plus an AR1 component that is independent of the principal. As before, we use the base, adjusted I and adjusted II measures of graduation rates and English exam scores. The graduation rates are again analyzed in log odds form.

Table 3: **Estimates of Dynamics ( $\rho$ )**

	$\rho$ estimate	s.e. ( $\rho$ )	(1 - $\rho$ ) estimate
Grad. rate (1 yr) - base	0.775***	0.144	0.225
- adjusted I	0.744***	0.174	0.256
- adjusted II	0.740***	0.173	0.260
Grad. rate (2 yrs) - base	0.781***	0.145	0.219
- adjusted I	0.753***	0.178	0.247
- adjusted II	0.751***	0.176	0.249
English Scores - base	0.821***	0.056	0.179***
- adjusted I	0.682***	0.052	0.318***
- adjusted II	0.733***	0.052	0.267***

*Notes:* Three \*'s denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. For graduation rates, 1726 observations. For English exam scores, 1615 observations. Student numbers used as weights.

We present estimates of  $\rho$  and  $(1 - \rho)$  in Table 3. For the graduation rate measures, all estimates of the initial impact of school principals,  $(1 - \rho)$ , are not statistically significantly different from zero, although the size of the impact, at approximately 0.25, is quite large. For English exam scores, however, the impact of school principals is quite precisely estimated and statistically significant for all three versions. Taking the estimate for the English exam scores adjusted for individual, peer, time and neighborhood characteristics (“adjusted II”), the impact factor of 0.27 implies that new school principals will have about one quarter of their potential full effects in their first year. After two years, they will have had an impact of around 0.46 of their full potential effect, i.e.  $(1 - \rho) * (1 + \rho) = 1 - \rho^2$ . After three years, the impact will be 0.61 times the full effect, i.e.  $(1 - \rho) * (1 + \rho + \rho^2) = 1 - \rho^3$ , and so on, with the effect gradually approaching the principal’s own full effect.

This dynamic model also provides estimates of school fixed effects and of the deviations in full principal effects from the first principal observed in each school. We present estimates of the variance of the complete set of estimated principal effects along with their standard errors in

Table 4.<sup>18</sup> Note that the variance of the full principal effects in the first column of the table are larger than the estimates of the variance of principal effects using the first estimation method that treated the principal effect as being constant at the same level each year the principal is leading each school.

In the third column of Table 4, we report estimates of the variance of the actual principal impacts. To create this, for each school year in our sample we construct the estimated impact for each principal who is leading a school in that year. The estimated impact for a given principal equals his or her full impact times  $(1 - \rho^j)$ , where  $j$  is the number of years the principal has been leading the school by the time we observe her in the particular school year. The numbers in column 3 correspond to the variance of these fitted impacts, using estimated impacts from all school years in our sample. Thus, this measure of principal impacts takes account of how long principals are actually in charge of schools in our sample period. As one would expect, the variances of these fitted impacts are similar in magnitude to the estimates of the variance of time invariant principal effects calculated using the first estimation method.

Our estimates of the full principal effects equal the true full effects plus random sampling error. As a result, our estimates of the variance of the full principal effects will exceed the true variance of the full principal effects. We thus are faced with a signal extraction problem, similar to that investigated by Kane et al (2008) when estimating teacher fixed effect variances. In response, we use a version of a shrinkage estimator to obtain estimates of the variance of the true principal effects. This essentially involves adjusting the variance of our estimated principal effects by the ratio of the variance of the signal to the sum of the variance of the signal and the variance of the noise (estimation error).

To understand the potential size of sampling variance, we start with a distribution of principal effects then take 500 random draws of principal effects vectors (of size 374 for graduation rates,

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<sup>18</sup>These variance measures, and all those that follow, include implied zeros for the first principal observed in each school, and are weighted by the number of years the principal leads the school.

Table 4: **Variance of Principal Effects: Dynamic Model**

	full effect		impact effect	
	variance	s.e.	variance	s.e.
Grad. rate (1 yr) - base	0.302	0.371	0.046	0.048
- adjusted I	0.205	0.265	0.036	0.039
- adjusted II	0.199	0.248	0.036	0.038
Grad. rate (2 yrs) - base	0.338	0.432	0.049	0.053
- adjusted I	0.220	0.299	0.038	0.043
- adjusted II	0.216	0.284	0.038	0.042
English Scores - base	16.047	9.944	1.390	0.774
- adjusted I	5.282	1.584	1.244	0.316
- adjusted II	7.260	2.711	1.260	0.407

*Notes:* Estimates constructed using the number of years a principal is in each school as weights. The estimated principal effects were first demeaned within each school, including the imposed zero for the first principal observed in each school. Standard errors constructed using delta method, using full variance-covariance matrix of  $\rho$ , school fixed effects and principal full effects.

348 for English exam scores, i.e. the number of individual principal effects we estimate) from it.

We calculate the variance of the principal effects for each random draw (i.e. the variance of the elements of the vector) and average these variances across the 500 draws. This is our estimate of the variance of the signal plus the noise. The ratio of the variance of the principal effects in the original distribution we draw from to this estimate of the variance of the signal plus the noise is the adjustment factor we are seeking. For the original distribution to draw from, we use our estimated distribution of full principal effects since this provides a distribution with the correct scale and covariance patterns.

The results of this exercise imply that the estimated variances in Table 4 overstate the true variance by on average 20 per cent for English exam scores, but by a significantly larger 420 to 500 per cent for graduation rates. The parameter estimates were measured with much less precision for the graduation rate outcome, thus the “noise” in the estimates was expected to be much higher.

After applying our adjustment to uncover the variance of the true principal effects, our estimates from the Adjusted II measures indicate that a one standard deviation more effective principal would raise graduation rates (2 year) by 2.6 percentage points from the mean of 82 per cent, if left in a school “forever” (i.e., being allowed to have their “full” effect). A one standard deviation more effective principal would raise English exam scores by 2.5 percentage points, if left in a school “forever”.

We next conduct a variance decomposition exercise for the dynamic model to obtain another estimate of how much principals can matter. The decomposition follows the same structure as that employed to analyze the time invariant principal effect estimates above. Under our independence assumptions for the school, principal and composite error terms in Equation 11, we can write the variance of the graduation rate across schools as the sum of the variances of these three broad components. To obtain estimates of each of the component variances, we employ our within-school estimates using the dynamic model. For the variance of the composite error (student quality plus remaining shocks), we use the mean squared error from the estimated model (the mean of  $\nu_{st}(\rho)^2$ ). For the variance of the principal effects, we use our estimates of the true principal effects after applying the “shrinkage adjustment”. We multiply these adjusted full principal effects by the relevant impact factor. That is, we begin by assuming all principals are in their first year at a school, so the adjusted full principal effects are all multiplied by  $(1 - \rho)$ . We then construct a second decomposition assuming all principals are in their second year, and multiply all the adjusted full principal effects by  $(1 - \rho^2)$ , and so on. We again construct the variance of the school fixed effects as a residual, i.e., as the variance of the raw across-school variance in student outcomes at a point in time (the year 2004) minus the variance of the composite error, minus an estimate of the variance of the principal effects constructed using the impact factor for principals in their third year of leading a school. We use the third year impact factors to construct the variance of school effects since on average we observe principals when they are in their third

year in a school.<sup>19</sup>

The results of these decompositions for the adjusted  $H^2$  measures of the graduation rate (2 year) and English exam scores are summarized in Table 5. Note that for both outcome measures, the proportion of the cross-sectional variation in student outcomes that could be attributed to school principals is quite small if principals were all in their first year in a school. This proportion grows as school principals lead a school for more years, reaching 11.3 and 58.8 percent for graduation rates and English exam scores respectively if school principals were left in schools long enough to have their full effect. Thus, school principals can have quite a large effect on student outcomes if they are given enough time to do so. Their effect is much larger on English exam scores than on graduation rates, a result consistent with the estimates using the constant effects model.

The result that principals have a much larger impact on test scores than graduation rates is clearly a point of interest. There is a substantial literature on the determinants of dropping out. One way to read the results in that literature is that even with extensive sets of explanatory variables, we do not predict dropping out well. For example, Foley et al (2010), examine dropping out using a rich Canadian dataset that includes information on previous grades, peers, cognitive ability tests, non-cognitive ability measures, family educational background and income, school characteristics and parental and child educational aspirations. Even when using a very substantial set of these measures, the pseudo- $R^2$  is only  $x$ . This may imply that dropping out of high school is determined by factors that are hard to measure and may, by the same token, hard for a principal to influence. In comparison, through actions such as changing the curriculum, a principal may be able to have effects on students who have some commitment to being in school. One, admittedly indirect, way to check this is to see where in the distribution of test scores principals appear to have their greatest effect. Using various percentiles of a school's English score distri-

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<sup>19</sup>We could not use the school fixed effects we estimated using this model to construct this variance as those fixed effects also included the impact of the initial principal in each school.

Table 5: **Percentage of Outcome Variance Attributable to School Principals**

	year 1	year 2	year 3	year 4	year 5	year 6	FULL
Grad. rate (2 yrs)	0.8	2.5	4.3	5.9	7.3	8.3	11.9
English scores	9.3	23.5	34.5	42.0	47.0	50.5	58.8

*Notes:* Authors calculations based on estimates using the adjusted II measures. First column assumes all principals are in their first year at a new school, second column that all are in their second year, etcetera.

bution rather than the mean as the dependent variable in our dynamic effects estimator, we find that principals have a much larger impact on the 75th than the 25th percentile (using the Adjusted II measure). This fits with a notion that whatever the principals in our sample do, it appears to be more about changing outcomes for committed students than altering results for students nearer to the margin of dropping out.

The dynamic model we have estimated thus far is based on a simple one parameter model governing the adjustment path for principals to affect schools. The effect of leadership on schools is implicitly assumed to have a smooth curved shape in the number of years a principal is leading a school. Student outcomes are assumed to change more towards the principal’s full effect in the initial years a principal is leading the school, then changes slow down as the years pass and the full principal effect is being approached. Note also that these movements can be up or down, depending on whether the new principal is of higher or lower quality than the previous one leading the school. We also investigated more flexible specifications in which we allowed our adjustment parameter,  $\rho$ , to vary with the number of years a principal has led a school.<sup>20</sup> In particular, we first examined a fully flexible specification in which  $\rho$  was allowed to be different for each year of the principal’s tenure. However, this resulted in quite imprecise estimates (especially at higher

<sup>20</sup>We also investigated whether student outcomes changed on average in one specific direction (up or down) by the number of years a principal has led a school, and in the two years prior to a principal change. No significant effects were found; that is, student outcomes did not significantly decline on average prior to a principal change, nor did outcomes improve or decline on average when a new principal joined a school.



Table 6: **Estimates of Dynamics ( $\rho$ ) - Added Flexibility**

		$\rho$ estimate	s.e. ( $\rho$ )	(1 - $\rho$ ) estimate
Grad. rate (1 yr) - base	first yr	0.831***	0.125	0.169
	all other yrs	0.423*	0.246	0.577**
- adjusted I	first yr	0.773***	0.153	0.227
	all other yrs	0.483	0.311	0.517*
- adjusted II	first yr	0.777***	0.154	0.223
	all other yrs	0.456*	0.309	0.544*
Grad. rate (2 yrs) - base	first yr	0.850***	0.127	0.150
	all other yrs	0.400	0.244	0.600**
- adjusted I	first yr	0.794***	0.152	0.206
	all other yrs	0.461	0.303	0.539*
- adjusted II	first yr	0.798***	0.153	0.202
	all other yrs	0.447	0.300	0.553*

*Notes:* One, two and three \*'s denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 1726 observations. Student numbers used as weights.

years of tenure) and so we turned to specifications with more structure for the adjustment path.

An examination of basic data patterns for the graduation rate outcomes suggested to us that a model in which  $\rho$  was allowed to take one particular value in the principal's first year at a school and another distinct value for all subsequent years matched the data well. In more flexible specifications in which we allowed  $\rho$  to take different values in years 2, 3, 4, etcetera, we could not reject the restriction that  $\rho$  takes one value for all years after year 1 at any conventional significance level.<sup>21</sup>

We present estimates from the specification with two  $\rho$  values in Table 6. The most notable point from these estimates is the substantially larger estimates for  $\rho$  for year 1 than for the  $\rho$  value governing the adjustment path for all subsequent years. This implies that principals are not able to impact graduation rates in a school to any substantial degree in their first year but move

<sup>21</sup>Specifications restricting  $\rho$  to follow a linear relationship with the number of years a principal leads a school were also estimated, i.e.  $\rho_j = \rho_0 + \rho_1 \cdot j$  where  $j$  is the number of years a principal has led a school. This specification fit the data less well than the two  $\rho$  model we present.

Table 7: **Percentage of Outcome Variance Attributable to School Principals - Two  $\rho$  Model**

	year 1	year 2	year 3	year 4	year 5	year 6	FULL
Grad. rate (1 yr)	0.5	4.0	6.6	7.9	8.5	8.8	9.1
Grad. rate (2 yrs)	0.4	4.2	7.0	8.4	9.0	9.3	9.6

*Notes:* Authors calculations based on estimates using the adjusted II measures. First column assumes all principals are in their first year at a new school, second column that all are in their second year, et cetera.

much more rapidly toward their “full” effect thereafter. Given the estimates for the Adjusted II, year 2 measure, a principal would only reach 20% of his or her full effect after year 1 but would be at 93% of it by year 4.

As in the one  $\rho$  model, we conducted a simple decomposition analysis for this particular model for the graduation rate outcomes. The results of these decompositions are presented in Table 7. These decompositions reveal the expected pattern of a small observed effect of principals in the first year they lead a school, but a much larger effect after that. The full effect estimates are also similar to those for the one  $\rho$  model.

While a model with two distinct  $\rho$  values fit the data well for the graduation rate outcomes, for the English exam score outcome, the original one  $\rho$  model was all that was supported by the data. In particular, when we estimated more flexible specifications, the hypothesis that  $\rho$  is equal across all years a principal leads a school could not be rejected at any conventional significance level.

## 6.1 Robustness Checks

One concern with our estimation strategy is that our estimates of the effect of principals may reflect over time trends in student outcomes that are specific to schools. Some schools may be improving over time for reasons unrelated to principal movements, while others may be falling

backwards. Our estimates of principal effectiveness based on principal turnover may attribute these trends, if they exist, to principals. In order to check whether such trends may be affecting our results, we re-estimated our dynamic models after including school-specific linear time trend terms. Given our short time-frame of 10 years, our estimator did struggle to precisely identify both the linear time trend effect and the school principal effects, as certain school principal changes (i.e. just one change over the period) may look very similar to linear trends over time.

The upper panel of Table 8 provides the estimates of  $1 - \rho$  while allowing for school-specific trends.<sup>22</sup> The estimates for  $1 - \rho$  are generally larger than those reported in Table 3, implying faster adjustment to the full principal effect in these estimates than those estimated without the linear time trend terms included. Note also that these estimates of  $1 - \rho$  are statistically different from zero even for the graduation rate outcomes. The lower panel of Table 8 contains estimates of the variance of principal effects. In this case, the estimates of the variance of full principal effects are generally larger than those reported in Table 4. The impact effects (taking account of the speed of adjustment  $1 - \rho$ ) are much higher, reflecting the larger estimates of  $1 - \rho$ . The standard error on these variances are also larger. When we construct our estimates of the proportion of the outcome variance attributable to school principals (reported in Table 9), the estimates of the full effect (last column) are quite similar to those in Table 5 for the graduation rate outcome, and a little larger for English scores. The estimated contribution of principals in their early years in a school are higher in these estimates than in Table 5, however, due to the larger estimates of the impact factor  $1 - \rho$ .

As described in section 2, one potential concern given our data is that a principal who lowers the pre-grade 12 dropout rate may appear to be a bad principal in our data (which only starts in grade 12). Recall that this does not appear to be a concern for what Aman (2010) calls "regular" students but might be for Aboriginal and ESL students since the latter groups have

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<sup>22</sup>We present only the estimates from our preferred specification (using the adjusted II measures) here. Estimates using the other measures are presented in web appendix C.

**Table 8: Estimates of Dynamic Model - Includes School-Specific Time Trends**

	$\rho$ estimate	s.e. ( $\rho$ )	(1 - $\rho$ ) estimate	
Graduation rate (1 yr)	0.496**	0.238	0.504**	
Graduation rate (2 yrs)	0.506**	0.201	0.494**	
English scores	0.542***	0.027	0.458***	
	Variance of Principal Effects			
	full effect		impact effect	
	variance	s.e.	variance	s.e.
Graduation rate (1 yr)	0.259	0.261	0.146	0.135
Graduation rate (2 yrs)	0.259	0.226	0.143	0.120
English Scores	13.742	1.872	6.682	0.815

*Notes:* Using adjusted II measures only. Two and three \*'s denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. For graduation rates, 1726 observations. For English Exam Scores, 1615 observations. Student numbers used as weights. Estimates constructed using the number of years a principal is in each school as weights. The estimated principal effects were first demeaned within each school, including the imposed zero for the first principal observed in each school. Standard errors constructed using delta method, using full variance-covariance matrix of  $\rho$ , school fixed effects and principal full effects.

**Table 9: Percentage of Outcome Variance Attributable to School Principals - Includes School-Specific Time Trends**

	year 1	year 2	year 3	year 4	year 5	year 6	FULL
Grad. rate (2 yrs)	2.3	5.2	6.9	7.9	8.4	8.7	8.9
English Scores	41.4	62.4	70.2	73.6	75.2	76.0	76.9

*Notes:* Authors calculations based on estimates using the adjusted II measures. First column assumes all principals are in their first year at a new school, second column that all are in their second year, et cetera.

non-trivial dropout rates before grade 12. To check whether this is affecting our results, we re-estimated our dynamic effects model only using students who are not Aboriginal or ESL students. For this group, there is much less concern regarding a select sample being enrolled in grade 12. The results from this estimation are provided in Tables 10 and 11. The estimates of the dynamic process in the top panel of Table 10 suggest a slightly slower adjustment to the principal full effects (smaller  $1 - \rho$ ) for the graduation outcomes and nearly identical results for the English scores to those using the full sample in Table 3. The estimates of the variance of principal effects in the lower panel indicate smaller variances for the graduation rate effects than with the full sample, though they also have much larger standard errors and continue not to be statistically significantly different from zero. For the English scores, the results are much closer. For both graduation rates and English scores, however, the combination of dynamics and full effect variances imply variances of the impact effects that are very similar between the full and restricted samples. When we construct our estimates of the proportion of the outcome variance attributable to school principals in Table 11, the estimates for English scores are essentially the same as in Table 5. For graduation rates, the results are quite similar for years 1 through 6, but the full effect is almost double in these estimates. This reflects the slower adjustment process estimated for graduation rates that has been estimated. Overall, the results for the restricted sample indicate that the pre-grade 12 dropout behaviour of Aboriginal and ESL students (or whatever else is special about them) is not driving our main conclusions.

## 7 Conclusions

Our results indicate that individual school principals can matter in terms of affecting high school student outcomes. This conclusion, though, depends heavily on how we treat the dynamics of a principal's impact on a school. In particular, when we use the Rivkin et al (2005) type estimator in which we assume that a given principal's impact is the same for each year he or she is at a

**Table 10: Estimates of Dynamic Model - Excludes Native and ESL Students**

	$\rho$ estimate	s.e. ( $\rho$ )	(1 - $\rho$ ) estimate	
Graduation rate (1 yr)	0.802***	0.185	0.198	
Graduation rate (2 yrs)	0.844***	0.190	0.156	
English Scores	0.740***	0.051	0.260***	
	Variance of Principal Effects			
	full effect		impact effect	
	variance	s.e.	variance	s.e.
Graduation rate (1 yr)	0.352	0.645	0.039	0.062
Graduation rate (2 yrs)	0.535	1.292	0.039	0.084
English Scores	7.606	2.880	1.246	0.407

*Notes:* Using adjusted II measures only. Two and three \*'s denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. For graduation rates, 1726 observations. For English Exam Scores, 1615 observations. Student numbers used as weights. Estimates constructed using the number of years a principal is in each school as weights. The estimated principal effects were first demeaned within each school, including the imposed zero for the first principal observed in each school. Standard errors constructed using delta method, using full variance-covariance matrix of  $\rho$ , school fixed effects and principal full effects.

**Table 11: Percentage of Outcome Variance Attributable to School Principals - Excludes Native and ESL Students**

	year 1	year 2	year 3	year 4	year 5	year 6	FULL
Grad. rate (2 yrs)	0.7	2.3	4.4	6.5	8.6	10.5	22.3
English Scores	9.9	24.9	36.4	44.2	49.5	53.1	61.8

*Notes:* Authors calculations based on estimates using the adjusted II measures. First column assumes all principals are in their first year at a new school, second column that all are in their second year, et cetera.

school, we do not find any statistically significant effects of principals on graduation rates and only limited evidence of impacts on grade 12 English exam results. However, when we allow for the possibility that it takes time for principals to have their full effect on a school, we find that individual principals can have substantial impacts on both outcomes if given enough time at a school to make their mark. Specifically, consider a scenario in which a school draws principals A and B, with their own idiosyncratic effects, and allows them to remain in charge long enough to realize their full effects. If B's personal effect is one standard deviation higher in the distribution of full principal effects then graduation rates will be higher by 2.6 percentage points (on a mean of 82) and English exam scores will be higher by 2.5 percentage points (on a mean of 69) under B than A according to our estimates. If B followed A on the job, though, it would take several years for the difference to be evident in the school outcomes and five years before B would reach even 75% of her full effect. The fact that principals remain in a school for an average of only 3 years means that it is difficult to capture the full effects of principals using a Rivkin et al (2005) type estimator.

Our results suggest that principals have a stronger impact on English exam scores than on graduation rates. This could arise if graduation rates are a more difficult outcome for principals to influence. Getting at-risk students to remain in school may take considerable effort. Raising average English exam scores, however, may simply involve directing teachers to place a stronger emphasis on "teaching to the test". Principals may also differ more considerably on the weight they place on raising grade 12 exam scores than they do on the weight they place on improving graduation rates. All principals may have strong preferences for improving graduation rates, and thus will devote efforts to improving them. Principals may differ in their preferences for raising grade 12 English exam scores if an emphasis on English exam scores comes at the cost of reducing other student outcomes such as developing non-cognitive skills and the development of students' general life skills.

A considerable amount of principal turnover that we observe in the data stems from school principals leaving the BC high school system, which may reflect quits from this type of career. Being a school principal is a stressful job, and many school districts are finding it difficult to attract quality applicants and to keep successful principals in their jobs. Our results suggest that the specific principal in charge can make an important difference in student outcomes. As a result, there may be a role for public policy in increasing efforts to retain good school principals.



## Appendix A: School Principal Turnover Term Construction

In this appendix, we present a simple example of the construction of the principal turnover term in equation 6.

$$E \left[ \frac{1}{n} \sum_{c=1}^n (\theta_{st} - \bar{\theta}_s)^2 \right] = E \left[ \frac{1}{n} \sum_{c=1}^n (\theta_{st}^2 + \bar{\theta}_s^2 - 2\theta_{st}\bar{\theta}_s) \right] \quad (13)$$

In this example, there are two principals in our school (with principal effects  $\theta_j$  and  $\theta_k$ ), and each is leading the school for three years, giving a total number of years of six ( $n = 6$ ). To begin, take the expectation of one term (cohort or year) within the school average, where the principal in charge is principal  $j$  (thus  $\theta_{st} = \theta_j$ ).

$$\begin{aligned} E[\theta_j^2 + \bar{\theta}_s^2 - 2\theta_j\bar{\theta}_s] &= E[\theta_j^2] + E \left[ \left( \frac{1}{6}(\theta_j + \theta_j + \theta_j + \theta_k + \theta_k + \theta_k) \right)^2 \right] \\ &\quad - 2 E \left[ \theta_j \left( \frac{1}{6}(\theta_j + \theta_j + \theta_j + \theta_k + \theta_k + \theta_k) \right) \right] \end{aligned} \quad (14)$$

Using our definition of  $E[\theta_j^2] = \sigma_{\theta_s}^2$  and our assumption that  $E[\theta_j\theta_k] = 0$ , this equation can be written as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} E[\theta_j^2 + \bar{\theta}_s^2 - 2\theta_j\bar{\theta}_s] &= \sigma_{\theta_s}^2 + \frac{1}{6^2} (3^2 + 3^2) \sigma_{\theta_s}^2 - 2 \frac{1}{6} (3) \sigma_{\theta_s}^2 \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \sigma_{\theta_s}^2 \end{aligned} \quad (15)$$

In the turnover term for this particular school, we have six equivalent terms to that above in the school average. So, our turnover term here is also simply one half.

Now, we can follow the same method to show how we develop the turnover term for the general case. Again let us look at one element of the school average term, where principal  $j$  is again in charge. There are a total of  $J$  principals in the school over the sample period, each in charge for  $q_k$  years, where  $k = 1, \dots, J$ , and  $\sum_{k=1}^J q_k = n$ . In this general case, principal  $j$  is in charge for  $q_j$  years.

$$\begin{aligned} E[\theta_j^2 + \bar{\theta}_s^2 - 2\theta_j\bar{\theta}_s] &= E[\theta_j^2] + \frac{1}{n^2} E \left[ \left( \sum_{c=1}^n \theta_{cs} \right)^2 \right] - 2 \frac{1}{n} E \left[ \theta_j \sum_{c=1}^n \theta_{cs} \right] \\ &= \sigma_{\theta_s}^2 \left[ 1 + \frac{1}{n^2} \sum_{k=1}^J q_k^2 - \frac{2}{n} q_j \right] \end{aligned} \quad (16)$$

Averaging this term over the  $n$  years that school  $s$  is in our sample yields equation 6, our turnover term for the general case. This average in equation 6 uses the fact that for each principal  $j$ , there are  $q_j$  equivalent terms to equation 16 in the school average.

## Appendix B: First Stage Estimates

Table B1: First Stage - Base Measures

	Grad. rate (1 year)		Grad. rate (2 years)		English Scores	
	Coeff.	s.e.	Coeff.	s.e.	Coeff.	s.e.
1996	0.019	0.016	0.013	0.017	0.70 <sup>a</sup>	0.10
1997	0.088 <sup>a</sup>	0.015	0.076 <sup>a</sup>	0.017	-0.06	0.10
1998	0.171 <sup>a</sup>	0.016	0.150 <sup>a</sup>	0.017	-0.83 <sup>a</sup>	0.10
1999	0.233 <sup>a</sup>	0.016	0.218 <sup>a</sup>	0.017	-0.35 <sup>a</sup>	0.10
2000	0.325 <sup>a</sup>	0.016	0.298 <sup>a</sup>	0.017	0.89 <sup>a</sup>	0.10
2001	0.393 <sup>a</sup>	0.016	0.370 <sup>a</sup>	0.017	1.38 <sup>a</sup>	0.10
2002	0.500 <sup>a</sup>	0.016	0.484 <sup>a</sup>	0.018	2.01 <sup>a</sup>	0.10
2003	0.519 <sup>a</sup>	0.017	0.467 <sup>a</sup>	0.018	1.35 <sup>a</sup>	0.10
2004	0.515 <sup>a</sup>	0.016	0.185 <sup>a</sup>	0.017	3.22 <sup>a</sup>	0.10
observations	442,504		442,504		316,248	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> / R <sup>2</sup>	0.0060		0.0042		0.0088	

*Notes:* Superscripts  $a$ ,  $b$  and  $c$  denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. For graduation rates, Logit estimates. For English exam scores, OLS estimates.

Table B2: **First Stage - Adjusted Measures I**

	Grad. rate (1 year)		Grad. rate (2 years)		English Scores	
	Coeff.	s.e.	Coeff.	s.e.	Coeff.	s.e.
male	0.956 <sup>a</sup>	0.199	2.766 <sup>a</sup>	0.207	2.64 <sup>b</sup>	1.06
First Nation	-1.024 <sup>a</sup>	0.022	-1.017 <sup>a</sup>	0.023	-4.75 <sup>a</sup>	0.17
ESL student	-0.972 <sup>a</sup>	0.025	-0.707 <sup>a</sup>	0.028	-9.26 <sup>a</sup>	0.15
French	-0.328 <sup>a</sup>	0.098	-0.457 <sup>a</sup>	0.101	-0.83	0.56
other language	0.236 <sup>a</sup>	0.019	0.346 <sup>a</sup>	0.021	-5.63 <sup>a</sup>	0.09
age (in months)	-0.050 <sup>a</sup>	0.001	-0.050 <sup>a</sup>	0.001	-0.17 <sup>a</sup>	0.00
male*First Nation	0.159 <sup>a</sup>	0.031	0.194 <sup>a</sup>	0.032	0.80 <sup>a</sup>	0.26
male*ESL student	0.118 <sup>a</sup>	0.032	0.099 <sup>a</sup>	0.035	1.33 <sup>a</sup>	0.20
male*French	0.326 <sup>b</sup>	0.140	0.341 <sup>b</sup>	0.145	0.47	0.85
male*other lang.	-0.067 <sup>a</sup>	0.023	-0.074 <sup>a</sup>	0.025	0.65 <sup>a</sup>	0.11
male*age	-0.007 <sup>a</sup>	0.001	-0.015 <sup>a</sup>	0.001	-0.03 <sup>a</sup>	0.01
Peer - male	-1.363 <sup>a</sup>	0.088	-0.879 <sup>a</sup>	0.095	-2.57 <sup>a</sup>	0.43
Peer - First Nation	-1.221 <sup>a</sup>	0.061	-1.176 <sup>a</sup>	0.064	-15.83 <sup>a</sup>	0.55
Peer - ESL students	0.868 <sup>a</sup>	0.049	0.615 <sup>a</sup>	0.053	8.11 <sup>a</sup>	0.28
Peer - French	0.849	0.835	2.312 <sup>b</sup>	0.910	34.90 <sup>a</sup>	4.43
Peer - other lang.	-0.550 <sup>a</sup>	0.027	-0.480 <sup>a</sup>	0.029	-0.66 <sup>a</sup>	0.14
1996	0.006	0.016	-0.002	0.018	0.73 <sup>a</sup>	0.10
1997	0.071 <sup>a</sup>	0.016	0.047 <sup>a</sup>	0.018	0.05	0.10
1998	0.141 <sup>a</sup>	0.017	0.099 <sup>a</sup>	0.018	-0.70 <sup>a</sup>	0.10
1999	0.162 <sup>a</sup>	0.017	0.125 <sup>a</sup>	0.018	-0.33 <sup>a</sup>	0.10
2000	0.239 <sup>a</sup>	0.017	0.183 <sup>a</sup>	0.019	0.83 <sup>a</sup>	0.10
2001	0.311 <sup>a</sup>	0.017	0.258 <sup>a</sup>	0.019	1.34 <sup>a</sup>	0.10
2002	0.383 <sup>a</sup>	0.018	0.333 <sup>a</sup>	0.019	1.93 <sup>a</sup>	0.10
2003	0.433 <sup>a</sup>	0.018	0.336 <sup>a</sup>	0.020	1.52 <sup>a</sup>	0.10
2004	0.419 <sup>a</sup>	0.018	0.028	0.019	3.46 <sup>a</sup>	0.10
observations	442,504		442,504		316,248	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> / R <sup>2</sup>	0.0774		0.0798		0.1263	

*Notes:* Superscripts *a*, *b* and *c* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. For graduation rates, Logit estimates. For English exam scores, OLS estimates. ESL - English as a second language. French - French spoken at home. Other language - language other than English or French spoken at home. Peer characteristics measured as proportion of students in same school and year (except oneself) with that particular characteristic.

**Table B3: First Stage - Adjusted Measures II, including Neighborhood Characteristics**

	Grad. rate (1 year)		Grad. rate (2 years)		English Scores	
	Coeff.	s.e.	Coeff.	s.e.	Coeff.	s.e.
male	0.996 <sup>a</sup>	0.215	2.776 <sup>a</sup>	0.225	2.20 <sup>c</sup>	1.13
First Nation	-1.001 <sup>a</sup>	0.024	-0.994 <sup>a</sup>	0.024	-4.53 <sup>a</sup>	0.17
ESL student	-0.998 <sup>a</sup>	0.027	-0.730 <sup>a</sup>	0.030	-9.39 <sup>a</sup>	0.16
French speaking	-0.267 <sup>b</sup>	0.109	-0.402 <sup>a</sup>	0.112	-0.70	0.61
other language	0.237 <sup>a</sup>	0.020	0.345 <sup>a</sup>	0.022	-5.57 <sup>a</sup>	0.09
age (in months)	-0.049 <sup>a</sup>	0.001	-0.050	0.001	-0.16 <sup>a</sup>	0.00
male*First Nation	0.162 <sup>a</sup>	0.032	0.198 <sup>a</sup>	0.033	0.89 <sup>a</sup>	0.27
male*ESL student	0.105 <sup>a</sup>	0.034	0.086 <sup>b</sup>	0.038	1.29 <sup>a</sup>	0.22
male*French speaking	0.295 <sup>c</sup>	0.153	0.321 <sup>b</sup>	0.158	0.39	0.90
male*other lang.	-0.046 <sup>c</sup>	0.024	-0.051	0.026	0.69 <sup>a</sup>	0.12
male*age	-0.007 <sup>a</sup>	0.001	-0.015 <sup>a</sup>	0.001	-0.03 <sup>a</sup>	0.01
Peer - male	-1.659 <sup>a</sup>	0.095	-1.110 <sup>a</sup>	0.102	-5.92 <sup>a</sup>	0.46
Peer - First Nation	-0.879 <sup>a</sup>	0.082	-0.841 <sup>a</sup>	0.086	-7.08 <sup>a</sup>	0.71
Peer - ESL students	0.786 <sup>a</sup>	0.055	0.492 <sup>a</sup>	0.059	5.86 <sup>a</sup>	0.31
Peer - French speaking	1.824 <sup>c</sup>	0.934	3.417 <sup>a</sup>	1.015	18.24 <sup>a</sup>	4.85
Peer - other lang.	-0.359 <sup>a</sup>	0.038	-0.385 <sup>a</sup>	0.042	0.31	0.20
N - Lone parents	-0.277 <sup>a</sup>	0.080	-0.389 <sup>a</sup>	0.086	-0.58	0.46
N - Number rooms	0.094 <sup>a</sup>	0.009	0.098 <sup>a</sup>	0.010	0.16 <sup>a</sup>	0.05
N - Rented proportion	-0.221 <sup>a</sup>	0.056	-0.138 <sup>b</sup>	0.060	0.16	0.32
N - Non-English at home	-0.216	0.168	-0.021	0.183	-2.72 <sup>a</sup>	0.92
N - Immigrants	0.107	0.111	0.205 <sup>c</sup>	0.120	-3.20 <sup>a</sup>	0.60
N - First nation	-0.389 <sup>a</sup>	0.105	-0.191 <sup>c</sup>	0.109	-3.41 <sup>a</sup>	0.71
N - Unemployment rate	-0.609 <sup>a</sup>	0.171	-0.555 <sup>a</sup>	0.183	-6.83 <sup>a</sup>	1.00
N - Less than grade 9	1.404 <sup>a</sup>	0.209	0.958 <sup>a</sup>	0.227	13.51 <sup>a</sup>	1.17
N - University educated	0.152	0.140	0.033	0.152	12.95 <sup>a</sup>	0.74
N - other post-secondary	0.525 <sup>a</sup>	0.146	0.541 <sup>a</sup>	0.158	3.81 <sup>a</sup>	0.81
N - family income (\$'000s)	0.004 <sup>a</sup>	0.001	0.004 <sup>a</sup>	0.001	0.00 <sup>b</sup>	0.00
N - dwelling value (\$'000s)	-0.000 <sup>a</sup>	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.00 <sup>a</sup>	0.00
Observations	400,116		400,116		287,047	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> / R <sup>2</sup>	0.0825		0.0846		0.1373	

*Notes:* Superscripts *a*, *b* and *c* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. For graduation rates, Logit estimates. For English exam scores, OLS estimates. ESL - English as a second language. French - French spoken at home. Other language - language other than English or French spoken at home. Peer characteristics measured as proportion of students in same school and year (except oneself) with that particular characteristic. N - neighbourhood characteristics taken from 2001 Canadian Census. For discrete neighbourhood characteristics, measures are proportions of the local population. Year indicators also included.

Table B4: **Summary Statistics for First Stage Estimations**

	Mean	Standard deviation
Graduation rate (1 year)	0.772	0.419
Graduation rate (2 years)	0.818	0.386
English Exam Scores (per cent)	68.8	12.4
male	0.511	0.500
First Nation	0.047	0.212
ESL student	0.066	0.248
French speaking	0.003	0.051
other language	0.200	0.400
age (months)	213.3	15.5
Peer - male	0.511	0.043
Peer - First Nation	0.047	0.065
Peer - ESL students	0.066	0.115
Peer - French speaking	0.003	0.005
Peer - other language	0.200	0.226
N - Lone parents	0.248	0.088
N - Number rooms	6.738	1.000
N - Rented proportion	0.274	0.143
N - Non-English at home	0.083	0.106
N - Immigrants	0.261	0.168
N - First nation	0.037	0.051
N - Unemployment rate	0.085	0.035
N - Less than grade 9	0.064	0.040
N - University educated	0.167	0.101
N - other post-secondary	0.499	0.091
N - ave. family income	66412	19059
N - value of dwellings	235741	115735
Observations	442,504	
Observations (English scores)	316,248	
Observations (Neighbourhood characteristics)	400,116	

*Notes:* ESL - English as a second language. French - French spoken at home. Other language - language other than English or French spoken at home. Peer characteristics measured as proportion of students in same school and year (except oneself) with that particular characteristic. N - neighbourhood characteristics taken from 2001 Canadian Census. For discrete neighbourhood characteristics, measures are proportions of the local population. Lower number of observations for the neighbourhood characteristics is due to no such characteristics being able to be linked for students in 1995.

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